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Abstract
In this letter, we consider the problem of distributed Bayesian detection in the presence of data
falsifying Byzantines in the network. The problem of distributed detection is formulated as a binary
hypothesis test at the fusion center (FC) based on 1-bit data sent by the sensors. Adopting Chernoff
information as our performance metric, we study the detection performance of the system under Byzan-
tine attack in the asymptotic regime. The expression for minimum attacking power required by the
Byzantines to blind the FC is obtained. More specifically, we show that above a certain fraction of
Byzantine attackers in the network, the detection scheme becomes completely incapable of utilizing
the sensor data for detection. When the fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind the FC, we
also provide closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that most
degrade the detection performance.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed detection is a well studied topic in the detection theory literature [1]–[3]. In
distributed detection systems, due to bandwidth and energy constraints, the nodes often make
a 1-bit local decision regarding the presence or absence of a phenomenon before sending it to
the fusion center (FC). Based on the local decisions transmitted by the nodes, the FC makes a
global decision about the presence or absence of the phenomenon of interest. The performance
of such systems strongly depends on the reliability of the nodes in the network. The distributed
nature of such systems makes them quite vulnerable to different types of attacks. One typical
attack on such networks is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine attacks (originally proposed by
[4]) may, in general, refer to many types of malicious behavior, our focus in this letter is on
data-falsification attacks [5]–[12].
Distributed detection in the presence of Byzantine attacks has been explored in the past
in [7], [8], where the problem of determining the most effective attacking strategy of the
Byzantine nodes was explored. In [7], the authors considered the Neyman-Pearson (NP) setup
and determined the optimal attacking strategy which minimizes the detection error exponent.
This approach, based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD), is analytically tractable and yields
approximate results in non-asymptotic cases. They also assumed that the Byzantines know the
true hypothesis, which obviously is not satisfied in practice but does provide a bound. In [8],
the authors analyzed the same problem in the context of collaborative spectrum sensing under
Byzantine Attacks. They relaxed the assumption of perfect knowledge of the hypotheses by
assuming that the Byzantines determine the knowledge about the true hypotheses from their
own sensing observations. Schemes for Byzantine node identification have been proposed in [8],
[12]–[15]. Our focus in this letter is considerably different from Byzantine node identification
schemes in that we do not try to authenticate the data; we determine the most effective attacking
strategies and distributed detection schemes that are robust against attacks.
All the approaches discussed so far for distributed detection schemes robust to Byzantine
attacks consider distributed detection under the Neyman-Pearson (NP) setup. In contrast, we
focus on the impact of Byzantine nodes on distributed Bayesian detection, which has not been
considered in the past. Adopting Chernoff information as our performance metric, we study the
performance of distributed detection systems with Byzantines in the asymptotic regime. We are
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Fig. 1. System Model
interested in answering the following questions.
• From the Byzantines’ perspective, what is the most effective attacking strategy?
• What is the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to blind the FC?
• From the FC’s perspective, knowing the fraction of Byzantines in the network, or an
upper bound thereof, what is the achievable performance not knowing the identities of
compromised nodes?
The signal processing problem considered in this letter is most similar to [8]. Our results,
however, are not a direct application of those in [8]. While as in [8], we are also interested in
the worst distribution pair, our objective function and, therefore, the techniques to find them are
different. In contrast to [8], where only optimal strategies to blind the FC were obtained, we
also provide closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that
most degrade the detection performance when the fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind
the FC. Indeed, finding the optimal Byzantine attacking strategies is only the first step toward
designing a robust distributed detection system. The knowledge of optimal attack strategies can
be further used to implement the optimal detector at the FC.
II. DISTRIBUTED DETECTION IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
Consider two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent) and H1 (signal is present). Also, consider
a parallel network (see Figure 1), comprised of a central entity (known as the Fusion Center
(FC)) and a set of N sensors (nodes), which faces the task of determining which of the two
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4hypotheses is true. Prior probabilities of the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are denoted by P0 and
P1, respectively. The sensors observe the phenomenon, carry out local computations to decide
the presence or absence of the phenomenon, and then send their local decisions to the FC that
makes a final decision after processing the local decisions. Observations at the nodes are assumed
to be conditionally independent and identically distributed. A Byzantine attack on such a system
compromises some of the nodes which may then intentionally send falsified local decisions to
the FC to make the final decision incorrect. We assume that a fraction α of the N nodes which
observe the phenomenon have been compromised by an attacker. We consider the communication
channels to be error-free. Next, we describe the modus-operandi of the nodes in detail.
A. Modus Operandi of the Nodes
Based on the observations, each node i makes a one-bit local decision vi ∈ {0, 1} regarding
the absence or presence of the phenomenon using the likelihood ratio test
p
(1)
Y i (yi)
p
(0)
Y i (yi)
vi=1
≷
vi=0
λ (1)
where λ is the identical threshold1 used at all the sensors and p(k)Y i (yi) is the conditional probability
density function (PDF) of observation yi under the hypothesis Hk, where k = 0, 1.
Each node i, after making its one-bit local decision vi, sends ui to the FC, where ui = vi
if i is an uncompromised (honest) node, but for a compromised (Byzantine) node i, ui need
not be equal to vi. We denote the probabilities of detection and false alarm of each node i in
the network by Pd = P (vi = 1|H1) and Pf = P (vi = 1|H0), respectively, which hold for both
uncompromised nodes as well as compromised nodes.
In this letter, we assume that each Byzantine decides to attack independently relying on its own
observation and decision regarding the presence or absence of the phenomenon. Specifically, we
define the following strategies PHj,1, P
H
j,0 and P
B
j,1, P
B
j,0 (j ∈ {0, 1}) for the honest and Byzantine
nodes, respectively:
Honest nodes:
PH1,1 = 1− PH0,1 = PH(x = 1|y = 1) = 1 (2)
1It has been shown that the use of identical thresholds is asymptotically optimal [16].
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Byzantine nodes:
PB1,1 = 1− PB0,1 = PB(x = 1|y = 1) (4)
PB1,0 = 1− PB0,0 = PB(x = 1|y = 0) (5)
where PH(x = a|y = b) (PB(x = a|y = b)) is the probability that an honest (Byzantine) node
sends a to the FC when its actual local decision is b. From now onwards, we will refer to
Byzantine flipping probabilities simply by (P1,0, P0,1). We also assume that the FC is not aware
of the identities of Byzantine nodes and considers each node i to be Byzantine with a certain
probability α.
B. Performance Criterion
The Byzantine attacker always wants to degrade the detection performance at the FC as much
as possible; in contrast, the FC wants to maximize the detection performance. The detection
performance at the FC in the presence of the Byzantines, however, cannot be analyzed eas-
ily for the non-asymptotic case. To gain insights into the degree to which an adversary can
cause performance degradation, we consider the asymptotic regime and employ the Chernoff
information [17] to be the network performance metric that characterizes detection performance.
If u is a random vector having N statistically independent and identically distributed com-
ponents, uis, under both hypotheses, the optimal detector results in error probability that obeys
the asymptotics
lim
N→∞
lnPE
N
= −C(pi1,1, pi1,0), (6)
where the Chernoff information C is defined as
C = max
0≤t≤1
− ln(
∑
j∈{0,1}
pitj0pi
1−t
j1 ). (7)
pij0 and pij1 in (7) are the conditional probabilities of ui = j given H0 and H1, respectively.
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pi1,0 = α(P1,0(1− Pf ) + (1− P0,1)Pf ) + (1− α)Pf (8)
and
pi1,1 = α(P1,0(1− Pd) + (1− P0,1)Pd) + (1− α)Pd, (9)
where α is the fraction of Byzantine nodes.
From the Byzantine attacker’s point of view, our goal is to find P1,0 and P0,1 that minimize
Chernoff information C for a given value of α. Observe that, when α ≥ 0.5, Chernoff information
can be minimized by simply making posterior probabilities equal to prior probabilities (we
discuss this in more detail later in the letter). However, for α < 0.5, a closed form expression
for Chernoff information is needed to find P1,0 and P0,1 that minimize C.
III. CLOSED FORM EXPRESSION FOR THE CHERNOFF INFORMATION
In this section, we derive a closed form expression for the Chernoff information, when
α < 0.5.2 To obtain the closed form expression for Chernoff information, the solution of
an optimization problem is required: max
0≤t≤1
− ln(∑j∈{0,1} pitj0pi1−tj1 ). This is easy to evaluate
numerically because (
∑
j∈{0,1} pi
t
j0pi
1−t
j1 ) is convex in t. However, obtaining a closed form solution
for this optimization problem can be tedious. Fortunately, we can find a closed form expression
for the Chernoff information for α < 0.5.
Lemma 1. For α < 0.5, the Chernoff information between the distributions pi1,0 and pi1,1 (as
given in (8) and (9), respectively) is given by C = − ln(∑j∈{0,1} pit∗j0pi1−t∗j1 ) with
t∗ =
ln
(
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
ln
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
) . (10)
Proof: Observe that the problem of finding the optimal t∗ in (7) is equivalent to
min
0≤t≤1
ln(
∑
j∈{0,1}
pitj0pi
1−t
j1 ) (11)
2Similar results can be derived for α ≥ 0.5.
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mization (no constraint on the value of t) and later show that the solution of the unconstrained
optimization problem is the same as the solution of the constrained optimization problem. In
other words, the optimal t∗ is the same for both cases.
By observing that logarithm is an increasing function, the optimization problem as given in
(11) is equivalent to
min
t
[pit1,0pi
1−t
1,1 + (1− pi1,0)t(1− pi1,1)1−t]. (12)
Now, performing the first derivative test, we have
d
dt
[pit1,0pi
1−t
1,1 + (1− pi1,0)t(1− pi1,1)1−t]
= (1− pi1,1)
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t
ln
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)
+pi1,1
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t
ln
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)
. (13)
The first derivative (13) is set to zero to find the critical points of the function:(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
)t
=
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
(
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
. (14)
After some simplification, t∗ which satisfies (14) turns out to be
t∗ =
ln
(
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
ln
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
) . (15)
To determine whether the critical point is a minimum or a maximum, we perform the second
derivative test. Since
d2
d2t
[pit1,0pi
1−t
1,1 + (1− pi1,0)t(1− pi1,1)1−t]
= (1− pi1,1)
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t(
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)2
+pi1,1
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t(
ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
)2
(16)
is greater than zero, t∗ as given in (15) minimizes (12). Since 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ 1 (See proof in Appendix
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IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACK
First, we will determine the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to blind the decision
fusion scheme.
A. Critical Power to Blind the Fusion Center
In this section, we determine the minimum fraction of Byzantine nodes needed to make the
FC “blind” and denote it by αblind. We say that the FC is blind if an adversary can make the
data that the FC receives from the sensors such that no information is conveyed. In other words,
the optimal detector at the FC cannot perform better than simply making the decision based on
priors.
Lemma 2. In Bayesian distributed detection, the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to
make the FC blind is αblind = 0.5.
Proof: The FC becomes blind if the probability of receiving a given vector u is independent
of the hypothesis present. Using the conditional i.i.d. assumption, under which observations at
the nodes are conditionally independent and identically distributed, the condition to make the
FC blind becomes pi1,1 = pi1,0. This is true only when
α[P1,0(Pf − Pd) + (1− P0,1)(Pd − Pf )] + (1− α)(Pd − Pf ) = 0.
Hence, the FC becomes blind if
α =
1
(P1,0 + P0,1)
. (17)
α in (17) is minimized when P1,0 and P0,1 both take their largest values, i.e., P1,0 = P0,1 = 1.
Hence, αblind = 0.5.
Next, we find the optimal attacking strategies which minimize the Chernoff information.
B. Minimization of Chernoff Information
First, we minimize Chernoff information for α < 0.5. Later in the section, we generalize our
results for any arbitrary α. Since logarithm is an increasing function, the problem of minimizing
the Chernoff information is equivalent to the following problem:
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Fig. 2. (a) Chernoff information as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) for α = 0.4. (b) Chernoff information as a function of (P1,0, P0,1)
for α = 0.8.
maximize
P1,0,P0,1
pit
∗
1,0pi
1−t∗
1,1 + (1− pi1,0)t
∗
(1− pi1,1)1−t∗
subject to 0 ≤ P1,0 ≤ 1
0 ≤ P0,1 ≤ 1
(P1)
where α < 0.5 and t∗ is as given in (15).
Let us denote C˜ = pit∗1,0pi
1−t∗
1,1 + (1 − pi1,0)t∗(1 − pi1,1)1−t∗ . Observe that, maximization of C˜
is equivalent to the minimization of Chernoff information C. Next, in Lemma 3 we present the
properties of Chernoff information C (for the case when α < 0.5) with respect to (P1,0, P0,1)
that enable us to find the optimal attacking strategies in this case.
Lemma 3. Let α < 0.5 and assume that the optimal t∗ is used in the expression for the Chernoff
information. Then, the Chernoff information, C, is a monotonically decreasing function of P1,0
for a fixed P0,1. Conversely, the Chernoff information is also a monotonically decreasing function
of P0,1 for a fixed P1,0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Next, using Lemma 3, we present the optimal attacking strategies P1,0 and P0,1 that minimize
the Chernoff information, C, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Theorem 1. The optimal attacking strategy, (P ∗1,0, P ∗0,1), which minimizes the Chernoff informa-
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tion is
(P ∗1,0, P
∗
0,1)
 (p1,0, p0,1) if α ≥ 0.5(1, 1) if α < 0.5 ,
where, (p1,0, p0,1) satisfy α(p1,0 + p0,1) = 1.
Proof: The minimum value of C is zero and it occurs when pi1,1 = pi1,0. By (8) and (9),
pi1,1 = pi1,0 implies
α(P1,0 + P0,1) = 1. (18)
From (18), when α ≥ 0.5, the attacker can always find flipping probabilities that make the
Chernoff information equal to zero. When α = 0.5, P1,0 = P0,1 = 1 is the optimal strategy.
When α > 0.5, any pair which satisfies P1,0 + P0,1 = 1α is the optimal strategy. However, when
α < 0.5, (18) cannot be satisfied or in other words Byzantines can not make C = 0 since pi1,1
can not be made equal to pi1,0. From Lemma 3, when α < 0.5, the optimal attacking strategy,
(P1,0, P0,1), that minimizes the Chernoff information is (1, 1).
Next, to gain insights into Theorem 1, we present some illustrative examples that corroborate
our results.
C. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 2(a), we plot the Chernoff information as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) for (Pd =
0.6, Pf = 0.4) and α = 0.4. It can be observed that for a fixed P0,1 (P1,0) the Chernoff information
C is a monotonically decreasing function of P1,0, P0,1 (as has been shown in Lemma 3). In other
words, when α = 0.4, the attacking strategy, (P1,0, P0,1), that minimizes the Chernoff information
C is (1, 1).
Similarly, in Figure 2(b), we consider the scenario when the fraction of Byzantines in the
network is α = 0.8. It can be seen from Figure 2(b) that the minimum value of the Chernoff
information in this case is C = 0. Notice that, the attacking strategy, (P1,0, P0,1) that makes
C = 0 is not unique in this case. It can be verified that any attacking strategy which satisfies
P1,0+P0,1 =
1
0.8
would make C = 0. Thus, results presented in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) corroborate
our theoretical result presented in Theorem 1.
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V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of distributed Bayesian detection with Byzantine data, and char-
acterized the power of attack analytically. We obtained closed form expressions for the optimal
attacking strategies that most degrade the detection performance. The knowledge of optimal
attack strategies can be further used to implement the optimal detector at the FC. Also in
addition, if only an upper bound α˜ on α is available to the FC, then, optimal attack strategies
should be simply computed using the upper bound α˜. For any α ≤ α˜, the test designed with α˜
achieves an exponent no smaller than C(α˜). In the future, we plan to extend our analysis to the
non-asymptotic case.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ 1
First, we show that t∗ ≤ 1. We start from the following equality:
pi1,1
pi1,0
− 1 =
(
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
− 1− pi1,1
pi1,0
)
=
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
(
1− 1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
. (19)
By applying the logarithm inequality 1− 1
x
< ln(x) < (x− 1), ∀x > 0, to (19), we have
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
<
pi1,1
pi1,0
− 1
=
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
(
1− 1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
≤ 1− pi1,0
pi1,0
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 .
Now,
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
≤ 1− pi1,0
pi1,0
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
⇔ ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
pi1,1
1− pi1,1 ≤
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
⇔
ln
(
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
ln
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
) ≤ 1
⇔ t∗ ≤ 1.
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Next, we show that t∗ ≥ 0. First we prove that the denominator of t∗ is positive. Since
pi1,1 > pi1,0 for Pd > Pf and α < 0.5, we have
pi1,1 > pi1,0 (20)
⇔ (1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1 > 1 (21)
⇔ ln
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
)
> 0. (22)
Next we prove that the numerator of t∗ is nonnegative, and then t∗ is nonnegative. We start
from the following equality:
1− pi1,0
pi1,1
=
(
1− pi1,0
pi1,1
− 1− pi1,1
pi1,1
)
=
1− pi1,1
pi1,1
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 − 1
)
. (23)
By applying the logarithm inequality 1− 1
x
< ln(x) < (x− 1), ∀x > 0, to (23), we have
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
> 1− pi1,0
pi1,1
=
1− pi1,1
pi1,1
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 − 1
)
≥ 1− pi1,1
pi1,1
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 .
Now,
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
≥ 1− pi1,1
pi1,1
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
⇔ ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
pi1,1
1− pi1,1 ≥ 1
⇔ ln
(
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
≥ 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To show that, for the optimal t∗ and α < 0.5, Chernoff information, C, is monotonically
decreasing function of P1,0 while keeping P0,1 fixed is equivalent to showing that C˜, is mono-
tonically increasing function of P1,0 while keeping P0,1 fixed. Differentiating both sides of C˜
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with respect to P1,0, we get
dC˜
P1,0
= pit
∗
1,0pi
(1−t∗)
1,1
(
dt∗
P1,0
ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
+ (1− t∗)pi
′
1,1
pi1,1
+ t∗
pi′1,0
pi1,0
)
+ (1− pi1,0)t∗(1− pi1,1)(1−t∗)
(
dt∗
P1,0
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 − (1− t
∗)
pi′1,1
1− pi1,1 − t
∗ pi
′
1,0
1− pi1,0
)
In the above equation,
dt∗
P1,0
=
(
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
+ ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)(
G′
G
+
pi′1,1
pi1,1
+
pi′1,1
1− pi1,1
)
−
(
lnG+ ln
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)(
pi′1,1
pi1,1
− pi
′
1,0
pi1,0
+
pi′1,1
1− pi1,1 −
pi′1,0
1− pi1,0
)
(
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
+ ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)2
where G =
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1)) and
G′
G
=
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
(
pi′1,1
pi1,1
− pi
′
1,0
pi1,0
)
− ln pi1,1
pi1,0
(
pi′1,1
1− pi1,1 −
pi′1,0
1− pi1,0
)
ln
pi1,1
pi1,0
ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
.
Let us denote a1 = lnG+ln(pi1,1/(1−pi1,1)), a2 = ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)+ ln((1−pi1,0)/(1−pi1,1)), b1 =
(pi′1,1/pi1,1)+(pi
′
1,1/(1−pi1,1)), b2 = (pi′1,0/pi1,0)+(pi′1,0/(1−pi1,0)), c1 = pit∗1,0pi1−t
∗
1,1 ln(pi1,1/pi1,0), c2 =
(1−pi1,0)t∗(1−pi1,1)1−t∗ ln((1−pi1,0)/(1−pi1,1)), d1 = ((1−t∗)(pi′1,1/pi1,1)+t∗(pi1,0/pi1,0))pit∗1,0pi1−t
∗
1,1
and d2 = ((1 − t∗)(pi′1,1/(1 − pi1,1)) + t∗(pi1,0/(1 − pi1,0)))(1 − pi1,0)t∗(1 − pi1,1)1−t∗ . Now, C˜, is
monotonically increasing function of P1,0 while keeping P0,1 fixed if
a1[b1c1 + b2c2] + a2[−(G′/G)c1 + b1c2] + a22d1 > a1[b1c2 + b2c1] + a2[−(G′/G)c2 + b1c1] + a22d2
⇔ a22(d1 − d2) > (c1 − c2)(a1(b2 − b1) + a2((G′/G) + b1))
⇔ a22(d1 − d2) > 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (c1 − c2) = 0 as given in (14).
Now, to show that
dC˜
P1,0
> 0 is equivalent to show that (d1 − d2) > 0. In other words,
t∗(1−Pf )
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗]
+(1− t∗)(1−Pd)
[(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗]
> 0.
(24)
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Note that, [(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗]
≥ 0;
[(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗]
≤ 0.
Hence, (24) can be simplified to,
1− Pf
1− Pd >
(1− t∗)
[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
t∗
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗] . (25)
Similarly, for the optimal t∗ and α < 0.5, Chernoff information, C, is monotonically decreasing
function of P0,1 while keeping P1,0 fixed if (d1 − d2) > 0, which is equivalent to show that,
t∗(−Pf )
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗]
+ (1− t∗)(−Pd)
[(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗]
> 0.
(26)
Furthermore, (26) can be simplified to
Pf
Pd
<
(1− t∗)
[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
t∗
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗] . (27)
Combining (25) and (27), the condition to make Lemma 3 true becomes
Pf
Pd
<
(1− t∗)
[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
t∗
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗] < 1− Pf1− Pd . (28)
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Note that right hand inequality in (28) can be rewritten as(
1
t∗
− 1
)[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
<
1− Pf
1− Pd
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗]
⇔
(
1
t∗
− 1
)[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
<
1− Pf
1− Pd
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗]
⇔
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗ [
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
<
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗ [
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
⇔
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
)t∗ [
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
<
[
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
.
Using the result from (14), the above equation can be written as
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln
(
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1)
) ( pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
<
[
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
[
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)] .
Using the fact that G =
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln
(
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1)
) , we get
G <
[
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)(
1
pi1,1
)]
[
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)(
1
1− pi1,1
)] .
After some simplification, the above condition can be written as
1− Pf
1− Pd
[
G
1− pi1,0 −
1
pi1,0
]
<
(
1
t∗
− 1
)[
1
pi1,1
− G
1− pi1,1
]
⇔
(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[pi1,0(G+ 1)− 1] <
(
1
t∗
− 1
)
[1− pi1,1(G+ 1)]
1
t∗
[pi1,1(G+1)−1] <
(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1−pi1,0(G+1)]+ [pi1,1(G+1)−1]. (29)
Notice that, in the above equation
pi1,1(G+ 1) ≥ 1 and pi1,0(G+ 1) ≤ 1 (30)
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or equivalently
1− pi1,1
pi1,1
≤ G ≤ 1− pi1,0
pi1,0
. The second inequality in (30) follows from the
fact that ln
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
≥ ln
(
1−pi1,0
1−pi1,1
) 1− pi1,1
pi1,1
. Using logarithm inequality, we have ln
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
≥(
1− pi1,0
pi1,1
)
=
(
1− pi1,1
pi1,1
)(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 − 1
)
≥ ln
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)
1− pi1,1
pi1,1
. Similarly, to show that
the second inequality in (30) is true we show ln
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
≤ ln
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
. Using loga-
rithm inequality, ln
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
≤
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
− 1
)
=
(
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)(
1− 1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
≤ ln
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
.
Using these results we can then write (29) in the form below,
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1](
1− Pf
1− Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)] + [pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1]
< t∗
⇔ 1(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] + 1
< t∗. (31)
Similarly, the left hand side inequality in (28) can be written as,
Pf
Pd
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)1−t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)1−t∗]
<
(
1
t∗
− 1
)[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
⇔ Pf
Pd
[(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t]
<
(
1
t∗
− 1
)[(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t∗
−
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t∗]
⇔
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)t [
Pf
Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
<
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)t [
Pf
Pd
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
⇔
[
Pf
Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
<
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
)t∗ [
Pf
Pd
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
.
Using the results from (14), the above equation can be written as,[
Pf
Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)]
[
Pf
Pd
(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)] < ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln
(
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1)
) ( pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
.
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Lets denote G =
ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)
ln
(
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1)
) , we get
[
Pf
Pd
(
1
pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)(
1
pi1,1
)]
[
Pf
Pd
(
1
1− pi1,0
)
+
(
1
t∗
− 1
)(
1
1− pi1,1
)] < G.
After some simplification the above condition can be written as,(
1
t∗
− 1
)[
1
pi1,1
− G
1− pi1,1
]
<
Pf
Pd
[
G
1− pi1,0 −
1
pi1,0
]
⇔
(
1
t∗
− 1
)
[1− pi1,1(G+ 1)] <
(
Pf
Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[pi1,0(G+ 1)− 1]
⇔
(
Pf
Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)] + [pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] < 1
t∗
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1].
Using (30), the condition can be written as
t∗ <
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1](
Pf
Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)] + [pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1]
t∗ <
1(
Pf
Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] + 1
. (32)
Now from (31) and (32), Lemma 3 is true if
A =
1(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] + 1
< t∗ <
1
Pf
Pd
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] + 1
= B.
(33)
Next, we show that, the optimal t∗ is with in the region (A,B). We start from the inequality
Pf
Pd
pi1,1
pi1,0
< 1 <
1− Pf
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
⇔ Pf
Pd
pi1,1
pi1,0
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] <
1− pi1,0(G+ 1)
pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1 <
1− Pf
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1]
Let us denote, Y =
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)
[1− pi1,0(G+ 1)]
[pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1] , then the above condition can be
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written as,
Pf
Pd
Y
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 <
1− pi1,0(G+ 1)
pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1 <
1− Pf
1− PdY
pi1,0
pi1,1
(34)
Next, we use the log inequality,
x− 1
x
< ln(x) < (x− 1), ∀x > 0, to derive further results. Let
us focus our attention to the left hand side inequality in (34)
Pf
Pd
Y
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 <
1− pi1,0(G+ 1)
pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1
⇔ PfY
[
Gpi1,1
1− pi1,1 − 1
]
< Pd
[
1− Gpi1,0
1− pi1,0
]
⇔ PfY ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
< Pdln
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
(35)
Now, let us focus our attention to the right hand side inequality in (34)
1− pi1,0(G+ 1)
pi1,1(G+ 1)− 1 <
1− Pf
1− PdY
pi1,0
pi1,1
⇔ (1− Pd)
(
1− pi1,0
Gpi1,0
− 1
)
< (1− Pf )Y
(
1− 1− pi1,1
Gpi1,1
)
⇔ (1− Pd)ln
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
< (1− Pf )Y ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
(36)
Now using the results from (35) and (36), we can deduce that
(
Pf
Pd
)
Y <
ln
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
) < (1− Pf
1− Pd
)
Y
⇔ 1
1 +
(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)
Y
<
1
1 +
ln
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
<
1
1 +
(
Pf
Pd
)
Y
(37)
which is true from the fact that for a > 0, b > 0,
1
1 + a
<
1
1 + b
iff b < a. Next, observe that,
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t∗ as given in (15) can be written as
t∗ =
ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
ln
(
(1/pi1,0)− 1
(1/pi1,1)− 1
) = ln(G) + ln
(
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
ln
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+ ln
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
) .
Observe that, ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
≥ 0 and ln
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
≥ 0 or equivalently
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
≥ 1
and
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
≥ 1 from (30). Now,
t∗ =
1
1 +
ln
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)
+ ln
(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)
− ln(G)− ln
(
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
ln(G) + ln
(
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
=
1
1 +
ln
(
1
G
1− pi1,0
pi1,0
)
ln
(
G
pi1,1
1− pi1,1
)
.
Which along with (37) implies that
1
1 +
(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)
Y
< t∗ <
1
1 +
(
Pf
Pd
)
Y
or in other words, A < t∗ < B. This completes our proof.
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